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Formal and Informal Care: An Empirical
Bayesian Analysis Using the Two-part Model∗
Juan Du

Abstract
Informal care provided to the elderly by their children is proposed as a less expensive alternative to institutional long-term care. This paper explores how the elderly’s consumption of medical
care changes in response to changes in the informal care they receive from their children. Many
earlier studies have ignored both the endogeneity of informal care and the complicated nature of
health care utilization data. This paper develops a two-part model with informal care treated as an
endogenous regressor and imposes exclusion restrictions on the selection process. The model is
fitted using the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, in particular the Gibbs
sampler and the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm. The average treatment effects and the distributions
of the treatment effects are obtained via posterior simulation. The results indicate that informal
care provides a substitute for nursing home care and hospital inpatient care, but it does not affect
paid home health care on average. The treatment effects are heterogeneous. The largest substitution effects occur for nursing home and hospital inpatient care at the intensive margin. The policy
analysis suggests that informal care policies targeting the group that incurs the largest substitution
effect may help to reduce government spending on Medicaid and Medicare.
KEYWORDS: informal care, nursing home, hospital inpatient care, Bayesian, data augmentation,
treatment effect
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I

Introduction

Meeting the demand for long-term care has become a crucial issue in the
United States as the baby-boomer generation grows older and the share of
elderly aged over 80 in the population is projected to double between 2010
and 2050, reaching 7.4% in 2050 (OECD, 2011). Kemper et al. (2006) project
that 69% of all people turning 65 in the United States will need some form of
long-term care services while over 3 out of 10 will need family care for more
than 2 years and 1 out of 20 will spend more than $100,000 on long-term
care. This suggests a sizable right tail in the distribution of long-term care
expenditure.
In 2010, nursing home care (6%) and paid home health care (3%) together
accounted for 9% of total health care expenditure,1 approximately 1.4% of the
US GDP, or $203 billion. Long-term care spending grew faster than GDP
growth, and it is projected to grow at an average of 6.7% from 2012 - 2018,2
outpacing overall health care spending in the next 40 years (OECD, 2011).
Increased longevity has imposed increasing pressure on family members, traditionally the main source of long-term care. In addition, decreased fertility
and changes in the family structure, such as family size becoming smaller, more
daughters joining the labor force and delaying child-bearing, have reduced the
availability of family caregivers and put additional strain on long-term care
resources.3
The burgeoning demand for long-term care of the elderly has also introduced
tremendous pressure on public programs, which cover approximately 60% of
long-term care expenditures (Congressional Budget O¢ ce, 2004). Medicaid,
a means-tested program, is the dominant payer for nursing home care in the
United States, but only those who demonstrate a low enough income are eligible. Medicare is designed mainly to cover costs associated with short-term
rehabilitation care due to acute illness rather than long-term care. When broken down by payer type, in 2008, 41% of nursing home expenditures were
…nanced by Medicaid, 27% out-of-pocket, 19% by Medicare (19%), and the
remaining 7% by private long-term care insurance. For paid home health care
expenditure, Medicare paid 41%, and the rest was paid by Medicaid (35%),
out-of-pocket (10%), and private insurance (9%).4 As more and more baby
boomers become eligible for Medicare, it is projected that the growth of the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010.
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Projections
2008-2018.
3 There may be a decreasing trend in the number of disabilities and other limitations of the
elderly, which could o¤set the potential gap between the supply and demand of long-term
care, but this trend has not been shown to be persistent (Pezzin and Spillman, 2000).
4 Center for Medicare and Medicaid, National Health Expenditure Data, Table 2, 2008.
1
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public share will outpace that of the private share.5
However, both Medicaid and Medicare have experienced rapid cost growth
in the recent decade, and concerns about the sustainability of Medicare and
Medicaid have been growing. Many states struggle to contain Medicaid costs
when expanding it to institutional, home and community levels. Subsidies for
purchasing private long-term care insurance have been proposed and occasionally implemented over the last 15 years; however, perceptions of future uncertainty and a¤ordability, as well as the availability of public options through
Medicaid, have limited the growth of the private insurance market. Feder et al.
(2000) concluded that ‘A complex system of public and private funding often
leaves elderly persons at risk of …nancial catastrophe and inadequate care’.
This paper examines a less costly alternative to elderly’s long-term care:
informal care provided by family members. The percentage of elderly aged 70
and older receiving informal care increased from 8.1% in 1998 to 9.9% in 2010,
and the market value of informal care makes up approximately 60% of market
spending (Brown and Finkelstein, 2011). First, it is crucial to identify the
relationship between formal and informal care. This relationship has been examined in several studies that use data from various countries in di¤erent time
periods with di¤erent models, but no de…nite conclusions have been reached.
Second, it is important to understand the policy implications of informal care
and its e¤ects on Medicaid and Medicare spending, but almost no prior studies
have conducted such a policy analysis.
This paper uses the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to study the
relationship between informal care and formal medical care utilization. The
goal of this paper is to understand how medical care consumption, especially
long-term care utilization by the elderly, changes with the intensity of the
informal care they receive from their children. Whether informal care and
formal medical care are substitutes or complements may depend on the type
of care. Four major types of formal medical care are examined in this paper:
nursing home care, paid home health care, physician visits, and hospital care.
There are several challenges in estimating health care outcomes. A large
fraction of the elderly population does not use medical care during the period of
observation, leading to a mass of zeroes (the extensive margin), which must be
modeled separately from positive outcomes (the intensive margin). In addition,
utilization conditional on positive outcomes is highly skewed. For example,
86% of the sample did not stay in nursing homes in 2004, and the distribution
of utilization has a sizable right tail (see Figure 1). There are also signi…cant
challenges in identi…cation because formal and informal care decisions are often
made jointly by parents and children, and unobservables at the family and
5 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Projections
2008-2018.
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individual level could add to the complicated nature of this relationship.
This paper contributes to the body of research on informal and formal
care in several ways. First, informal care is treated as an endogenous variable. Some earlier studies (Hanley, 1990; Jette et al., 1995; Freedman, 1996)
treated informal care as exogenous. However, endogeneity may arise from unobservables, and treating informal care as exogenous may lead to misleading
inferences. This paper uses children’s characteristics as exclusion restrictions
and allows formal and informal care to be correlated, thus reducing bias from
unobservables. Second, this paper develops an endogenous two-part model for
medical care utilization. This model has the advantage of modeling zero and
positive outcomes separately while controlling for endogeneity. The proposed
model is subject to Bayesian analysis based on the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods, building on earlier works by Albert and Chib (1993), Koop
and Poirier (1997), Chib and Hamilton (2000), Geweke et al. (2003), and Deb
et al. (2006a, 2006b). In particular, latent variables generated through the
data augmentation method along with the Gibbs sampler and the MetropolisHastings algorithms (Albert and Chib, 1993) are implemented. This paper
shows the advantages of Bayesian methods, including computational convenience and the ability to determine distributions of the treatment e¤ects.
Bayesian methods also o¤er a unique way of testing endogeneity. Third, our
study relies on data that is more recent than the data used in earlier studies.6
This is important as several factors related to informal care may change overtime, such as the gender of caregivers and the technology used in caregiving.
Fourth, this paper contributes new insights to the literature by examining the
relationship by length of stay. In particular, long-term and short-term nursing
home care as well as care that follows hospital inpatient care are distinguished.
Lastly, a policy analysis by payer type is performed based on simulations for
two potential policies.
Evidence on whether informal care can reduce formal care utilization has
important policy implications. Many policies have been designed to give incentives for family members to provide informal care, for example, proposals that
provide tax credit (or exemption) for people who care for impaired relatives
living in their homes, proposals on o¤ering caregiver training, education, direct …nancial assistance, or funding for employment breaks, etc. There are also
policy interests in increasing the e¤ectiveness of informal care and in integrating formal and informal care in a system that is more e¢ cient for allocating
resources while reducing real care needs (Kodner and Kyriacou, 2000). To
evaluate these policy proposals, the relationship between formal and informal
6 For example, Van Houtven and Norton (2004, 2008) and Lo Sasso and Johnson (2002)
used data from 1993 and 1998. Hanley (1990), Newman and Struyk (1990) and Liu et al.
(2000) used data from 1982 and 1984.
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care needs to be carefully examined.
This paper …nds that the relationship between formal and informal care
di¤ers considerably by the type of care as well as by length of stay. Informal
care is a substitute for nursing home care and hospital inpatient care. It does
not a¤ect the probability of physician visits, but it does reduce the number
of visits. Departing somewhat from the literature, no statistically signi…cant
relationship is found between informal care and paid home care. With respect
to length of stay, I …nd that informal care has a larger e¤ect for the elderly
who stayed in nursing homes for more than a hundred days than those who did
not. A hundred days is the maximum length that Medicare pays for skilled
nursing facilities. In addition, the substitution e¤ect is very large for those
who had on average less than 3 days of hospital inpatient care, which does
not qualify for Medicare reimbursement. The treatment e¤ects di¤er across
di¤erent types of care at both the intensive and extensive margins. The largest
substitution e¤ects occur for nursing home and hospital care at the intensive
margin. Finally, the policy analysis shows that informal care policies that
target the group that incurs the largest substitution e¤ect may help reduce
government spending on Medicaid and Medicare.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of the literature, and Section III introduces the conceptual and modeling framework.
Section IV describes the main variables and the exclusion restrictions used in
the estimation. Section V reports the main results as well as results by the
type of care and length of stay. Section VI illustrates treatment e¤ects at the
intensive and extensive margins. Section VII provides a policy analysis focusing on potential cost reductions for Medicare and Medicaid. Section VIII tests
the endogeneity of informal care. The …nal section concludes. Implementation
of the Bayesian algorithms, computation of treatment e¤ects, and steps for
the MCMC procedure can be found in the appendices.

II

Literature

Several medical studies (Jette, et al., 1995; Freedman, 1996) …nd that living
with one’s spouse and children signi…cantly reduces the probability of nursing home stays whereas other medical studies (Hanley, 1990; Newman and
Struyk, 1990) do not …nd statistically signi…cant e¤ects. More recent work
in economics (Lo sasso and Johnson, 2002; Charles and Sevak, 2005) use the
Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD 1993, 1995) and …nd
that regular help from children reduces the likelihood of nursing home entry
for disabled Americans over 70, but Lo sasso and Johnson (2002) …nd no significant e¤ect when informal care is measured more broadly. The zero mass and
skewed distributions of positive outcomes are largely ignored in these studies,
4
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and the data they use oversampled people with disability.
Empirical work on the causal e¤ects governing the relationship between
paid home care and informal care is very limited. Two studies (Langa et
al., 2001; Liu et al., 2000) published in medical journals …nd that the elderly
who live with children received more paid home health care than did the
elderly who live alone. This suggests a somewhat complementary relationship
between paid home care and informal care. By contrast, Bosang (2009), using
European data and the instrumental variables approach, shows that informal
care replaced paid domestic help and that informal care is endogenous to the
decision of getting paid care.
Research studies on other types of health care utilization are few. Notable
exceptions are the study by Van Houtven and Norton (2004) and a recent
European study (Bolin et al., 2007). Van Houtven and Norton (2004) use
data from the 1995 AHEAD and the 1998 HRS and …nd that informal care
is a substitute for all types of formal care. However, Bolin et al. (2007) and
Bonsang (2009) apply similar models with European data and reach somewhat
di¤erent conclusions. For example, Bolin et al. (2007) …nd that informal care
and paid home care are substitutes, but informal care and hospitals inpatient
care and physician visits are complements.
The broader literature (Christianson, 1988; Weissert, 1988; Kemper, 1992)
on long-term care for the elderly includes various studies on the relationships
between community care, nursing homes, and informal caregiving based on
the national channeling experiment - a U.S. national intervention in the 1980s
that allocated resources toward community care as a substitute for nursing
home care as well as informal care. The general conclusion is that communitybased health care was not a cost-e¤ective substitute for nursing home care,
and the substitution e¤ects between several forms of long-term care were very
small. These results could be due to the fact that people at higher risk of
institutionalization were not well targeted in the experiment (Weissert, 1998).
As there is still no clear consensus in the literature, it is crucial to reexamine this topic at a time when aging is a¤ecting our lives more than ever.

III

Conceptual and modeling framework

The conceptual framework of this paper is based on two decision-making
processes. First, children maximize utility by deciding whether to provide care
and how much care to provide. This can be thought as a selection process in
which children select themselves to become caregivers. Secondly, elderly parents maximize utility by choosing whether to use formal care and how much
care to use, which also depends on the informal care decisions that their children make. In reality the two decisions are not made independently and are
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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often determined by characteristics of parents and children, and could be affected by factors that are not observed by researchers. Therefore, it is important to treat informal care as endogenous when estimating the relationship
between formal and informal care.
According to Andersen (1968), health care utilization can be viewed as a
function of predisposing factors, enabling factors, and need factors. Predisposing factors, which predicts the likelihood of using care, include demographic
variables (such as age and gender) and social structure variables (such as race
and education). Wealth, income, health insurance, and long-term care insurance are regarded as enabling factors that must be present for care to take
place. Need factors are the primary determinants of utilization, such as selfperceived health or actual illnesses (ADL, IADL, and chronic conditions). Although the observed factors may play di¤erent roles depending on the type of
care,7 they are all included as control variables in the equations that estimate
formal and informal care.
Under this framework, there is a potential for endogeneity stemming from
unobserved factors at both the family and individual level that a¤ect formal and informal care decisions. These factors may include values and the
knowledge people have about their health, their risk preferences, social networks and interactions, the availability of medical facilities, knowledge about
health providers, varying levels of insurance coverage, unrevealed or undiagnosed health information, children and parent relationships, etc. These unobserved factors are relevant in determining the relationship between formal and
informal care. For example, if an elderly person values her health greatly and
is very risk averse to health ‡uctuations, she may desire more formal and informal care. On the other hand, when the elderly person is socially active and
maintain a certain social status, she may perceive entering nursing homes as
a last resort, thus requiring child’s care as a substitute for institutional care.
This implies that the provision of informal care is likely to be endogenous
because unobservables determining informal care are likely to be correlated
with unobservables determining formal care. This paper reduces the potential omitted variable bias by using the instrumental variables approach that
assumes that certain children’s characteristics will only a¤ect informal care
decisions, and formal care decisions are not a¤ected directly. The residuals
from the selection equation are included in the formal care equation to control
for potential omitted variables.
Formal care utilization is modeled using the two-part model, following Duan
et al. (1982, 1983). The advantage of the two-part model as opposed to the
Tobit model is in its ability to avoid having a single distribution for both zero
7 For example, hospital inpatient care that often occurs in response to more serious illnesses, may be better explained by need factors.
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and positive outcomes. If the underlying distributions are di¤erent for zeros
and positive outcomes, the Tobit model would generate biased estimates. In
addition, hospital care and physician visits are measured as counts. This requires estimation using the Poisson distribution (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).
For nursing homes, log-normal distribution is used instead.
There are several hypotheses being tested in this paper. First, following
previous studies in the literature, I test whether informal care is a substitute
for or a complement to formal care. Second, I hypothesize that the e¤ect of
informal care on formal care di¤ers by length of stay and by Medicare eligibility, in particular, for nursing home and hospital inpatient care. The reason
is that a shorter length of stay is typically covered by Medicare, and informal
care may not result in large substitution e¤ects. Lastly, I hypothesize that
informal care is endogenous; that is, unobservables at the family or individual
levels should be accounted for.
Informal care decision
I begin the modeling framework by describing children’s decision-making process
when deciding to become caregivers. There are several factors that a¤ect both
the supply and demand of informal care. First, on the supply side, with more
and more daughters joining the labor force and contributing to their family
income, the opportunity cost of caregiving is higher than before. Based on
Bureau of Labor Statistics, labor force participation rates for women aged 55
to 64 increased from 44% in 1988 to 59% in 2008. For women aged 45 to
54, the labor force participation rate increased from 69% in 1988 to 76% in
2008.8 Carmichael, Charles, and Hulme (2010) show that children with high
earnings and full-employment face a higher opportunity cost than those who
are not in the paid employment, and the former are thus less likely to become
caregivers. This means that daughters are less available to provide the type of
care that involves substantial hours, including co-residential caring, and the
burden of informal care could fall on sons as primary or secondary caregivers.
It is thereofore important to include the employment status of both daughters
and sons when estimating the intensity of informal care.
On the demand side, parents’socioeconomic status and their need for care
play important roles. Parents with severe illnesses or multiple chronic conditions have higher needs for informal care. Availability of long-term care
insurance is expected to make long-term care more a¤ordable and to make
parents less dependent on children. Parents’wealth may become a factor as
an elderly person’s bequest motives may induce children to provide more care.
8 Labor force participation rate for men aged 55 to 64 increased from 67% in 1998 to 70%
in 2008 whereas men aged 45 to 54 experienced a slight decrease from 90% to 88%.
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Let z denote the latent utility associated with the desired hours of informal
care.
z =w +u
(1)
where u
N (0; 2u ). w includes parents’ demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics, health status, wealth, and insurance status. w also includes
children’s employment status as well as factors that a¤ect the availability of
children as caregivers. As these variables are used as exclusion restrictions,
they do not appear in the formal care equation. Let z be the hours of care
actually received by the elderly. z > 0 if the utility from desired hours of
care is greater than zero, and the elderly person receives informal care from
children, and z = 0 if the utility is less than or equal to zero, and the elderly
person does not receive informal care. In estimation, the logarithm of z is used.

Formal care decision
The focus of this paper is the second decision process –how do parents’formal
care utilization changes in response to changes in the informal care they receive
from children.
Traditionally we distinguish between two types of elderly care: healthrelated care and long-term social care. Health-related care addresses mental
health and physical health conditions, such as diabetes and heart diseases.
Long-term social care can be thought of as services that use non-medical inputs to support the daily functioning and broader well-being of the individual.
Informal care is more likely to serve as a substitute for long-term social care,
which requires less medical knowledge. However, informal care may have an effect on health-related care as well. For example, following a surgery or an acute
illness, the availability of informal caregivers could shorten hospital inpatient
stays or skilled nursing facilities utilization. On the one hand, lack of informal care can lead to avoidable admissions into and unnecessarily long stays
in hospitals. On the other hand, the availability of children can make healthrelated services easier to access and potentially enhance their e¤ectiveness. For
example, children can help their elderly parents better understand their treatment options, modify behaviors, and follow treatment schedules more carefully,
which may increase or decrease subsequent care. Children can also visit their
parents in nursing homes and improve their quality of life on weekends, and
they may facilitate transportation to hospitals should such a need arise. Johri
et al. (2003) …nd bene…ts in an integrated care model that combines healthrelated services and social care for the elderly, resulting in reduced use of acute
hospitalization and institutionalization as well as community-based services.
It is possible that formal and informal care are substitutes in some cases but
8

Brought to you by | Old Dominion University
Authenticated | jdu@odu.edu author's copy
Download Date | 11/27/12 11:53 PM

Du: Formal and Informal Care: An Empirical Bayesian Analysis

complements in others, with a considerable amount of heterogeneity across
individuals.
The standard two-part model consists of two parts. Part 1, the hurdle
part, is a binary probit model that speci…es (Pr(Y > 0 j x) = (x0 1 )) for
the full sample and part 2 is a log-linear model (E [ln(Y ) j Y > 0; x] = x0 2 )
conditional on positive outcomes. The endogenous two-part model di¤ers from
the standard two-part model in two respects: 1) endogeneity is controlled for
by allowing correlation between the error terms; 2) a count model is applied in
the second part for physician visits and hospital care whereas in the standard
two-part model, the second part is linear. This adds signi…cant nonlinearity
in the model, thus complicating computation. The details of the model are
described below.
Part 1: predicting the probability of positive formal care utilization. De…ne
latent variable Y1 as the di¤erence in utility between formal care utilization
and no utilization, and let Y1 be the binary variable taking values of 1 and 0,
indicating users and non-users. An individual becomes an user of formal care
if Y1 > 0. Y1 is determined by predisposing factors, enabling factors, and need
factors of the elderly (denoted by x) as well as the intensity of the informal
care they receive from children (denoted by z). Any unobserved factors are
included in the error term 1 . Mathematically, Y1 and Y1 can be written as,
Y1 = x

1

+z

1

+

1

(2)

1
if Y1 > 0
(3)
0
if Y1
0
Part 2: predicting the level of formal care utilization conditional on users.
There are several formal care variables in this paper, thus requires di¤erent
modeling assumptions. For physician visits and hospital inpatient care, I adopt
the count data model by assuming potential utilization (Y2 ) follows the Poisson
distribution with mean exp( ), de…ned as
Y1 =

=x

2

+z

2

+

2:

(4)

Utilization is determined by the same set of control variables as in part 1. The
actual utilization (Y2 ) is observed only if potential utilization is greater than
zero. The two-part modeling structure is particularly attractive if there are
many zeroes in the outcome.
For nursing homes, I use the log-normal distribution because nursing home
utilization has a much longer right tail (see Figure 1) than hospital utilization
and physician visits. Log-normal distribution is known to …t the right skewed
distribution relatively better than other distributions. Potential nursing home
utilization is de…ned as Ynh , and can be written as
Ynh = x

2

+z

2

+

2
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and Ynh = exp(Ynh ) if Y1 = 1; Ynh = 0 if Y1 = 0. Again positive outcomes are
observed for users.
A restrictive assumption of the standard two-part model is that the errors
( 1 ; 2 ) are independent. Following Deb et al. (2006a), correlation of the error
terms 1 and 2 are allowed by setting them as a function of the error term (u)
in the selection equation in the following fashion,
1

=u

1

+ v1 = (z

w )

1

+ v1

(6)

2

=u

2

+ v2 = (z

w )

2

+ v2

(7)

where cov(v1 ; v2 ) = 0; cov( 1 ; u) = 1 ; cov( 2 ; u) = 2 and v1
N (0; 1);
2
v2
N (0; ). The unobservables could a¤ect both selection and outcome
and it is reasonable to believe that the unobservables that determine selection
are a major source of endogeneity.
Therefore, plugging eqs. (6) and (7) into eqs. (2) and (4) yields,
Y1 = x
=x

1
2

+z

+z

+ (z

w )

+ (z

w )

1
2

with error variance-covariance matrix,
02 31 2 2 2
1

cov @4 2 5A = 4
u

+ v1

(8)

+ v2

(9)

1
2

u 1+1
2
u 1 2

2
u 1 2
2
2 2
u 2+

1

2

1
2
2
u

3
5

(10)

The observed dependent variables consist of (Y1 ; Y2 ; Ynh ; z) with corresponding latent variables (Y1 ; Y2 ; Ynh ; z ). The endogeneity of informal care can be
tested by a joint hypothesis test of ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 0), which will be illustrated
in detail in section VIII.
This model is estimated using the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) procedure because the likelihood function is intractable and does not
have analytical solutions. In particular, data augmentation for latent variables,
Gibbs sampling, and Metropolis Hasting are applied. The advantages of the
Bayesian method are demonstrated by the heterogeneous treatment e¤ects and
the test of endogeneity discussed in subsequent sections. A full description of
the Bayesian Algorithm can be found in Appendix A. The steps for the MCMC
procedure are shown in Appendix B.
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Figure 1. Histograms for medical care utilization
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Data

This paper uses the 2002 and 2004 wave of the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS). The HRS covers a wide range of information including family structure,
income, health care, as well as informal care provision. The HRS started
as a nationally representative sample at the baseline that consists of noninstitutionalized elderly Americans. The …rst wave began in 1992 and took
place every two years thereafter. The data used in this paper is comparatively
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more recent than the data used in earlier studies. This is important since
the relationship between formal and informal care is likely to change overtime.
With modern technology enhancing the communication of patients and doctors
and more sons joining daughters in becoming caregivers, the skills required for
caregivers may be di¤erent from those of the past. This changing nature of
caregiving could lead the relationship between formal and informal care to
di¤er.
TABLE 1A Descriptive Statistics

Number of observations

Full Sample

Treated

Non-treated

2317

1878

439

mean

s.d.

mean

s.d.

mean

s.d.

Independent Variables
Age

82.60

5.93

85.42

6.08

81.94

5.69

Sex (female=1)

0.79

0.41

0.85

0.36

0.78

0.42

Black(black=1)

0.12

0.33

0.17

0.38

0.11

0.31

Hispanic(Hispanic=1)

0.06

0.25

0.10

0.29

0.06

0.23

Years of education

11.26

3.51

9.77

3.91

11.60

3.31

Ln(total wealth)

9.95

4.05

8.38

4.55

10.31

3.83

Ln(total income)

9.69

0.93

9.41

0.99

9.76

0.90

Medicaid coverage(0/1)

0.16

0.36

0.32

0.46

0.12

0.32

Long-term care insurance(0/1)

0.10

0.29

0.04

0.20

0.11

0.31

Proxy respondent(0/1)

0.16

0.36

0.47

0.50

0.08

0.28

Number of IADL limits

0.90

1.56

2.67

1.85

0.50

1.15

Number of ADL limits

0.80

1.42

2.15

1.82

0.49

1.09

Self-rated health (1:excellent,5:poor)

3.18

1.08

3.73

1.00

3.05

1.06

Number of chronic conditions

2.70

1.40

3.36

1.44

2.55

1.35

3.84

2.67

3.23

2.21

Instrumental Variables
Number of adult children

3.34

2.23

Whether a child lives within 10 miles

0.62

0.48

0.71

0.45

0.59

0.49

Whether there is a resident child

0.19

0.39

0.34

0.47

0.15

0.36

Number of full-time working children

3.11

2.70

3.08

2.81

3.18

2.67

Note: the sample consists of single elderly aged 70 and older with at least one living
adult child. The treated group consists of elderly who received informal care.

Because the main focus of this paper is the demand for long-term care, the
sample is restricted to single individuals over 70 years old with at least one
living adult child. All variables are summarized in TABLE 1A (independent
variables and instruments) and 1B (dependent variables). The Rand HRS data
…le is a cleaned version of the original data that cover all cohorts and contain
consistently derived key variables. All variables are obtained from the Rand
12
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HRS data …le except for informal care and children-related variables, which
were separately obtained from the original HRS survey. The …nal data contain
2,317 observations.
Descriptive statistics
The full sample consists of 82% females, in part because women on average
outlive men (the sample average age is 82.6 years). The sample is mostly white
(12% black and 6% Hispanic) with an average education level of just under a
high-school degree and an average wealth of $252,747. 16% of the sample is
eligible for Medicaid and 9% has long-term care insurance9 .
The survey includes several measures of health status: help with a series
of activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs). The …ve categories of ADL limitations are walking, dressing,
bathing, eating and getting in and out of bed. The …ve categories of IADL
limitations are making phone calls, managing money, taking medication, shopping for groceries and preparing hot meals. The average numbers of ADL and
IADL limitations are, respectively, 0.80 and 0.90. Self-rated health status is
ranked from 1 to 5 (1 for excellent and 5 for poor). The number of chronic conditions is the sum of doctor diagnosed diseases that include histories of heart
attacks, strokes, high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, psychological problems, and arthritis. The average elderly person in the sample has
2.7 chronic conditions. A variable that did not receive attention from prior
studies is the proxy variable. A proxy respondent was asked to complete the
questionnaire if the respondent herself was not available at the time of the
interview or unable to give an interview. Most proxy respondents had physical or cognitive limitations that prevented them from being interviewed and
some of them lived in nursing homes. The HRS conducts a test on cognitive
abilities and a substantial number of proxy respondents achieved low scores on
the test. Therefore, the proxy variable is included in the estimating equation
to indicate cognitive functions and reduce omitted variable bias. We observe
that 47% of the elderly who had informal care are proxy respondents whereas
8% of those who did not have informal care are proxy respondents.
Informal care is de…ned as hours of care received from a child, the child’s
spouse, stepchild, stepchild’s spouse and grandchild in the last month. A
timing problem occurs because informal care refers to care received in the past
month whereas formal care refers to care received over the past two years. I
therefore de…ne informal care by using data from the 2002 wave, and I de…ne
formal care by using data from the 2004 wave. 428 individuals in the 2004
9 Based on the HRS, in 2008, 13.8% of individuals aged 60 and older had long-term care
insurance. In the late 1990s, only 10% had long-term care insurance. The number of longterm care insurance holders appears to be increasing.
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wave were not interviewed in 2002. For these individuals, the informal care
variable from the 2004 wave is used instead.
I de…ne receiving informal care as being treated. Descriptive statistics for
an average treated individual and a non-treated individual can be found in
TABLE 1A. Compared with the average elderly person who did not receive
informal care, the average treated elderly was 3.5 years older, more likely to
be a female, and had fewer years of education. The average treated elderly
person was more likely to be enrolled in Medicaid and less likely to have longterm care insurance. They also had a poorer health status. For example,
the average treated elderly person had approximately two more IADL/ADL
limitations and one additional chronic condition.
The dependent variables are formal care utilizations that include nursing
home care, paid home health care, physician visits, and hospital inpatient
care. Descriptive statistics can be found in TABLE 1B. Respondents were
asked whether they had been a patient overnight in a nursing home, convalescent home, or other long-term health care facility and, if yes, how long they
stayed there in the last two years. Nursing home, hospital care, and physician visits are examined in two ways: whether the service is used (part 1)
and intensity of utilization (part 2). Due to a lack of data, paid home health
care is only studied as a binary variable (part 1). 14% of respondents used
nursing home care in 2004 with an average length of stay of 1.43 months and
10.37 months for users. For the elderly who used nursing home care, the average length of stay was 12.5 months for those receiving informal care and 8.5
months for those not. This shows a positive correlation between informal care
and nursing home utilization. Over one-third of nursing home stays were for
one month or less, re‡ecting post-hospital recovery in a skilled nursing home
facility. Approximately 9% of the sample were in nursing homes at the time
of the interview.
For hospital inpatient care, respondents were asked whether they had been
a patient in a hospital overnight and if yes, how many nights they had stayed
over the last two years. For the 38% of the sample that used hospital care, the
average length of stay was 13 nights for those receiving informal care and 10 for
those not, with considerable amount of variation in the sample. With regard
to physician visits, respondents were asked how many times they had seen or
talked to a medical doctor about their health, including emergency room or
clinic visits over the past two years. 96% of the sample had seen a doctor, 13
times on average, 15 times for those receiving informal care and 12 times for
those not. With regard to paid home health care, 14% of respondents used
paid home health care in the past two years, 22% for those receiving informal
care and 11% for those not. In summary, for all types of utilization, the treated
group had consistently higher levels of utilization than the non-treated group.
14
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TABLE 1B Descriptive Statistics Dependent Variables
Full Sample
Number of observations

Treated

2317
mean

Non-treated

1878
s.d.

mean

439
s.d.

mean

s.d.

0

0

Dependent Variables
Any Informal care

0.19

0.39

1

0

Informal care hours

22.76

100.81

120.12

204.98

0

0

Any home health care

0.13

0.34

0.22

0.41

0.11

0.32

Any nursing home stay

0.14

0.35

0.35

0.47

0.09

0.28

Months in nursing homes

1.42

4.98

4.29

8.10

0.76

3.58

Months in nursing homes (+)

10.37

9.35

12.47

9.43

8.51

8.90

Any physician visit

0.96

0.19

0.97

0.17

0.96

0.19

Number of physician visits

12.52

15.77

15.32

18.27

11.86

15.06

Number of physician visits (+)

12.99

15.96

15.71

18.40

12.36

15.20

Any hospital care

0.38

0.48

0.51

0.50

0.35

0.48

Nights in hospital

4.21

13.33

6.67

15.98

3.63

12.58

Nights in hospital (+)

10.91

19.70

12.64

20.27

10.36

19.47

Note: our sample consists of single elderly aged 70 and older with at least one living
living adult child. The treated group consists of elderly who received informal care. (+)
indicates positive outcomes.

Exclusion restrictions
As in the case of the linear simultaneous equations model, the regressors in the
selection equation include one or more variables that can be excluded from the
outcome equation. In this paper, variables related to children’s characteristics
are considered potential instruments, and two sets of instruments are explored.
The variables under consideration are whether there is a child who lives within
10 miles, whether there is a resident child, the number of full-time working
children, the number of adult children, the number of adult daughters, and
the number of unmarried adult children.10 All variables are from the 2002
wave, as in the case of the informal care variable. Instruments are selected
based on the F-statistics that indicate the strength of the instruments, the R2
of the regression, and the statistical signi…cance of each variable. As shown
in TABLE 2, after controlling for geographical location, employment status,
and the number of children, the gender and marital status of children are
I also considered the number of frequent contact, children’s income, the number of
children’s o¤springs, and whether there is over $500 …nancial support from children as
exclusive restrictions, however the F statistics for these variables is 0.39, indicating weak
instruments thus they are not included in this paper.
10
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not statistically signi…cant.11 These variables are therefore not included as
exclusion restrictions.
The exclusion restrictions used in this study are whether a child lives within
10 miles, whether there is a resident child, the number of full-time working
children, and the number of adult children (TABLE 2 column 2). These four
instruments are applied in all regressions; together, they explain 36% of the
variation in informal care.
The instrumental variable approach identi…es the causal e¤ect of informal
care through marginal individuals for whom variations in informal care are
induced by instruments measuring the availability of children. As most single
elderly persons are cared for by their children if they are cared for informally,
the marginal elderly person represents a typical senior who has children. They
are more likely to be individuals who have needs for informal care such as those
with chronic conditions and disabilities and those who do not favor long-term
care in an institutional setting (such as females). They are also likely to be
middle-income seniors instead of the very rich or the very poor. The very poor
would qualify for Medicaid and the very rich would not hesitate to purchase
high-quality formal care for themselves.
TALBE 2 Selection of Instruments
Instrument

Set 1

Set 2

Whether a child lives within 10 miles

0.123* (0.057)

0.124* (0.057)

Whether there is a resident child

0.854* (0.073)

0.842* (0.071)

# of working children

-0.043* (0.017)

-0.038* (0.015)

# of children

0.074* (0.028)

0.086* (0.019)

# of daughters

0.046 (0.029)

# of unmarried children

-0.024 (0.032)

R-squared

0.363

0.363

F statistics for coe¢ cients = 0

32.83

48.49

Note: the dependent variable is the natural log of informal care hours. Age,
gender, education, assets and income, insurance, proxy variable. Health
conditions of the elderly are included as control variables. * indicates
statistically signi…cant at 5%. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

The average number of children for the full sample is 3.34. The number of
children and full-time working children for the elderly who received informal
care is 3.87 and 3.35, respectively, slightly higher than the number of children
for those who did not receive informal care (3.24 and 3.13). We also observe
Some studies …nd that daughters have a more signi…cant role than sons do in providing
informal care (e.g. Lo Sasso and Johnson, 2002), which is not supported in our sample.
11
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that 62% of the elderly in the sample have at least one child living within 10
miles and 19% have at least one resident child. The instruments are highly
predictive with an F statistic of 48.49.
The number, gender and geographic location of children have been considered by previous studies (Chevkovich et al., 2002; Stern, 1995; Charles and
Sevak, 2005; Bolin et al., 2007; Bonsang, 2008), but the working conditions
of children have not. This paper argues that the number of full-time working
children is one of the most important factors determining the availability of
caregivers. Work status represents the opportunity cost of caregiving and this
opportunity cost is expected to increase as more daughters join the labor force.
As shown in TABLE 2, additional full-time working children is associated with
a decrease in informal care hours by 3.8%. Given that the mean number of
hours of informal care is 23 for the full sample and 120 for the treated, 3.8%
translates to a 0.9 hour reduction in informal care during one month for the
full sample and a 4.5 hour reduction for the treated.
Some of the instrumental variables deserve further discussion. On the one
hand, children may choose to move closer or live with parents if their parents
have long-term care needs. On the other hand, parents may move in and live
with children due to deteriorating health conditions. The same logic applies
to the number of full-time working children, as a child may quit his/her job
to take care of their elderly parents if they cannot a¤ord living independently.
Children’s characteristics as instruments for informal care have been used and
tested in the literature (Charles and Sevak, 2005; Bolin et al., 2007), and no
evidence of endogeneity has been found with regards to the number of children
and the geographic location of children.
Two additional methods are used to check the validity of the exogeneity of
the instruments. First, I regress each instrument on elderly persons’ health
conditions and a set of control variables (x in eq. (2)). There are four health
indicators included in the regression: the number of ADL, the number of
IADL, self-rated health, and the number of chronic conditions. If any health
indicators are related to the children’s characteristics, the exogeneity assumption is likely to be violated. I …nd that almost none of the health indicators
are statistically signi…cant in predicting location and work status. 1213 Second, a refutability test is performed. A subsample of very healthy elderly (no
ADL, IADL, or chronic conditions) is chosen, that I do not expect their formal
care be a¤ected by informal care. The exogeneity assumption is likely to be
1 2 The only exception is that the number of chronic conditions is statististically signi…cant
at 5% when used to predict whether there is a resident child. For robustness check, I
excluded this variable, the results for all regressions did not vary much and therefore it is
not discussed further.
1 3 Charles and Savek (2005) …nd that health conditions of the elderly have no prediction
power for the variable that indicates children’s location.
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violated if children’s characteristics are associated with formal care for reasons other than informal care. However, no statistical associations are found
between the selected children’s characteristics and formal care for the very
healthy subsample, and this supports the exogeneity assumption.

V

Results

The results for nursing home care are presented in detail. The results for
other types of formal care are presented in the second subsection. Short-term
and long-term care and other subsample analyses are presented in the third
subsection. A sensitivity test is performed at the end of this section.
TABLE 3 E¤ect of Informal Care on Nursing Home Utilization
Part1 (hurdle)

Part2 (conditional)

Informal care

-0.181 (0.024)

-0.389 (0.104)

Informal care

Age

0.003 (0.002)

0.023 (0.009)

0.010 (0.004)

Sex (female=1)

0.012 (0.024)

0.036 (0.147)

0.181 (0.054)

Black

-0.174 (0.043)

0.215 (0.194)

0.025 (0.060)

Hispanic

-0.090 (0.032)

-0.036 (0.281)

-0.233 (0.082)

Years of education

0.003 (0.003)

0.027 (0.018)

-0.048 (0.006)

Ln (total wealth)

-0.007 (0.003)

-0.031 (0.013)

0.022 (0.006)

Ln (total income)

-0.009 (0.011)

0.064 (0.050)

-0.121 (0.023)

Medicaid coverage

0.126 (0.042)

0.576 (0.142)

-0.131 (0.059)

Long-term care insurance

-0.016 (0.033)

0.146 (0.263)

-0.115 (0.087)

Proxy respondent

0.174 (0.049)

0.283 (0.148)

0.369 (0.058)

# of IADL limits

0.089 (0.026)

0.209 (0.062)

0.507 (0.017)

# of ADL limits

0.054 (0.016)

0.129 (0.041)

0.083 (0.018)

Self-rated health

0.021 (0.012)

0.088 (0.060)

0.165 (0.022)

# of chronic conditions

0.022 (0.009)

-0.074 (0.043)

0.164 (0.015)

# of adult children

0.137 (0.012)

A child lives within 10 miles

0.344 (0.043)

Resident child

1.269 (0.045)

# of working children

-0.057 (0.011)

Variance
1;

0.867 (0.070)
0.468 (0.083)

2.095 (0.064)

0.404 (0.103)

2
Notes: posterior means are reported and standard deviations are in parentheses.
Part 1 is a probit model estimating nursing home utilization. The marginal e¤ects
are presented. Part 2 is a log-linear model for intensity of use.
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Results for nursing home care
Parameter estimates for nursing home care are reported in TABLE 3. Part
1 is a probit model estimating the probability of entering nursing homes, and
marginal e¤ects are reported. The coe¢ cients in the nursing home utilization
equation are interpreted as semi-elasticities because the dependent variable is
transformed using logarithm.
After controlling for endogeneity, I …nd that informal care is a substitute
for nursing home care. A 10% increase in informal care hours leads to a 1.8%
point decrease in the probability of entering nursing homes and a 3.9% decrease
in the length of stay conditional on nursing home users14 . This translates to
a 12-day reduction in a two-year period. Being Black or Hispanic decreases
the probability of entering nursing homes by 17% point and 9% point, respectively. Medicaid eligibility increases the probability of entering a nursing home
by 13% point and increases the length of stay by 57%. Long-term private insurance does not have an e¤ect on the probability of entering nursing homes or
on the length of stay. A small percent (9%) of the sample had long-term private insurance, and it is plausible that those with long-term care insurance are
more risk averse in health ‡uctuations and are thus less likely to have chronic
conditions. One additional IADL and ADL limitation increases the probability of entering a nursing home by 9% point and 5% point, respectively, and
increases the length of stay by 42% and 25%, respectively.
The coe¢ cients for the error term (u) in the selection equation are reported
in the last row of TABLE 3. These coe¢ cients represent the e¤ect of the unobservables on formal care utilization. The results show that the unobservables
increase the probability of entering a nursing home as well as the length of
stay. For example, there may be certain health conditions known to the elderly but unknown to the researchers that increase both formal and informal
care. Endogeneity can be tested using the Bayesian method by comparing the
likelihood of the model that restricts 1 = 2 = 0 with that of the model that
allows them to vary. Details for the test are presented in section VIII and
appendix A.
The determinants of informal care are presented in the last column of TABLE 3. Having an additional child and having a child who lives within 10
miles increases the hours of informal care by 14% and 34%, respectively,15
1 4 The marginal e¤ects of this paper are generally larger compared to studies that also use
the U.S. data. For example, Van Houtven and Norton (2004) show that a 10% increase
in informal care hours decreases the probability of nursing home use by 0.77% point and
decreases the length of stay by 1.8%. Other studies (Charles and Sevak, 2005; Lo Sasso and
Johnson, 2002) that use informal care as a binary variable …nd a 40–60% point decrease in
the probability of entering nursing homes with frequent children’s help.
1 5 Charles and Sevak (2005) …nd that having a child nearby is associated with a 12-16%
point higher probability of receiving informal care.
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which translates to an increase of 3 and 11 hours of informal care per month.
Among the four instruments, the presence of a resident child has the largest
coe¢ cient and is also the strongest indicator for informal care among all the
variables. The elderly who live with a child had 29 more hours of informal care
per month than those who did not have a resident child. In the sample 33% of
elderly persons with a resident child received informal care compared to 15%
for those without a resident child. All instruments are precisely estimated with
small standard errors. Other factors that have positive e¤ects on informal care
are being female, being a proxy respondent and having poor health conditions.
Being Hispanic, having more years of education, a higher income, Medicaid
eligibility and having private long-term care insurance decrease informal care
hours.
Results for other types of formal care
We next examine the estimates for other types of care shown in TABLE 4.
Informal care is found to be a substitute for nursing home and hospital inpatient care. A 10% increase in informal care hours reduces the probability of
hospital inpatient stays by 0.31% point and reduces the length of stay by 1.21
nights. The availability of informal care from children may lead to a quicker
discharge from nursing homes or hospitals.
TABLE 4A E¤ect of Informal Care for All Types of Formal Care
Probability (part1)

Intensity (part2)

Nursing home (months)

-0.181 (0.024)

-0.389 (0.104)

Hospital care (nights)

-0.031 (0.016)

-0.121 (0.062)

Physician visits (numbers)

0.039 (0.043)

-0.118 (0.035)

Home health care (prob.)

0.057 (0.068)

-

Note: posterior means are reported and standard deviations are included
in parentheses.

I also …nd that informal care does not a¤ect the probability of physician
visits but does decrease the number of visits. This is consistent with Van
Houtven and Norton (2004). Based on the distribution of the treatment e¤ect
(shown in Figure 2), large positive and negative e¤ects are found; however, they
cancel out after being averaged. As discussed above, children can facilitate
transportation to clinics, which increases the probability of physician visits.
The availability of children can also make one more visit to the doctor less
attractive because it is less costly.
For paid home care, informal care is shown not to have a signi…cant e¤ect.
This result departs somewhat from those of Van Houtven and Norton (2004),
20
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who …nd them to be substitutes. A further investigation shows that informal
care only serves as a substitute when the elderly is relatively healthy and has
no need for full-time informal care. To demonstrate this result, I decompose
sample into frail and non-frail. Frail is de…ned as having at least one IADL or
ADL limitation. The coe¢ cient of informal care is positive (0.102 (0.063)) for
the frail sample and negative (-0.378 (0.665)) for the non-frail sample, which
is consistent with the …ndings in Spillman and Pezzin (2000).
Subsample analysis
Several subsample analyses would be useful in examining the heterogeneous
e¤ects of informal care. First, I distinguish short-term and long-term nursing
home stay. Short-term users stay in nursing homes primarily for purposes of
rehabilitation or restoration of health from a sudden negative health shock,
such as a knee replacement surgery or a cardiovascular procedure. Long-term
users are individuals with severe disabilities or chronic conditions, such as
dementia or Alzheimer’s disease, and who have di¢ culty living independently.
The relationship between formal and informal care may be di¤erent for the two
types of users due to the nature of the utilization. As Medicare pays for skilled
nursing facilities for no more than a hundred days, and only if the utilization
follows a consecutive hospital stay of at least three days, I separate the sample
based on length of nursing home stay as well as hospital stay. Long-term users
are de…ned as those who stay in nursing facilities for more than a hundred
days.16 There are 176 long-term users (approximately 8% of the sample) and
143 short-term users (approximately 6% of the sample).
Second, the sample is separated based on the length of hospital stay. Individuals with at least three consecutive days of inpatient hospital stay qualify for Medicare reimbursement for the subsequent nursing facility utilization.
Quali…cation for Medicare reimbursement could potentially make informal care
less attractive. However, the HRS only contains information on the total number of nights in a hospital during the two years before the interview, and the
length of each stay is therefore unknown. Because 58% of the hospital users
had only one hospital stay in the past two years, I de…ne the average length of
stay as total nights divided by number of stays. There are 164 elderly persons
who averaged at least three nights in a hospital and they had also entered
nursing homes.
The results by length of stay are presented in TABLE 4B. Only intensity of
utilization is examined in this analysis. I …nd that informal care has a larger effect for long-term nursing home users (-0.162 (0.075)) than for short-term users
1 6 85% of the nursing home users stayed in nursing homes for only once during the two
years before the interview.
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(-0.012 (0.06)). For those who had on average less than three days of hospital
inpatient care, the e¤ect of informal care is the largest across all subsamples.
This con…rms the expectation that the substitution e¤ect of informal care is
larger when nursing home utilization does not meet Medicare reimbursement
criterion. This result may have implications for long-term care policies. For
example, policy makers have discussed removing the three-day hospital stay
requirement. Based on our analysis, this proposal would potentially increase
Medicare spending by making family members less likely to provide informal
care.
TALBE 4B E¤ect of Informal Care on Nursing Home Utilization by Length of Stay
Subsample de…nition

Informal care coe¢ cient

Sample size

Long-term NH (> 100 days)

-0.162 (0.075)

176

Short-term NH (between 0 and 100)

-0.012 (0.060)

143

Hospital care (

3 nights)

Hospital care (between 0 and 3)
Short-term NH + hospital
Long-term NH + hospital

3 nights
3 nights

-0.206 (0.147)

164

-0.852 (0.313)

155

-0.055 (0.048)

104

-0.335 (0.123)

60

Note: Part 2 of the two-part model and the equation for informal care are used in
this analysis. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

To check the robustness of this result, I examine two additional subsamples
by length of stay: short-term nursing home users with at least three nights in
a hospital and long-term nursing home users with at least three nights in a
hospital. I expect to …nd little e¤ect of informal care for the …rst subsample
because payment is covered by Medicare. For the second subsample, informal
care may potentially reduce long-term care costs for the elderly because the
cost above a hundred days cannot be reimbursed unless the person is eligible
for Medicaid. The results are consistent with the expectation that informal
care acts as a substitute for nursing home utilization for long-term users but
does not do so for short-term users.
Sensitivity test
The insurance variables are potentially endogenous. Medicaid eligibility can
come from spending-down due to nursing home utilization, and long-term care
insurance purchase decisions may be made with expected utilization in mind.
According to America’s Health Insurance Plan, 2007, the average age of
long-term care insurance buyers was 61 years old in 2005, and 84% of buyers
were younger than 70 years old. 71% of buyers had an income of more than
$50,000, and 61% were college graduates. It can be argued that because in-
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surance choices were typically made at an earlier age and by individuals in
high income categories, the endogeneity problem of long-term care insurance
may be mitigated because our sample consists of those above 70 years old.
Nevertheless a sensitivity analysis is performed. I focus on two subsamples
that are likely to cause endogeneity: those who had long-term care insurance
and those who newly purchased long-term care insurance. Approximately 9%
of the sample had insurance in 2004. 2.4% of the sample had long-term care
insurance in 2004, but did not have it in 2002, and we would expect that
new buyers would be more likely to use formal care. The two subsamples are
separately excluded from the full sample and the results for nursing home utilization are presented in TABLE 4C. No signi…cant changes in estimates are
detected. The only noticeable change is that the e¤ects of informal care are
slightly smaller for the subsamples.
TABLE 4C Sensitivity Analysis
Informal Care

Medicaid

LTC insurance

(1) Full sample

-0.389 (0.104)

0.576 (0.142)

0.146 (0.263)

(2) Exclude LTC insured

-0.295 (0.088)

0.571 (0.136)

NA

(3) Exclude newly LTC

-0.298 (0.089)

0.600 (0.136)

0.329 (0.270)

(4) Exclude newly Medicaid

-0.356 (0.100)

0.658 (0.149)

0.177 (0.262)

Note: the coe¢ cients shown are for Part 2 of the two-part model. The coe¢ cients
for Part 1 are largely unchanged. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

For Medicaid, endogeneity arises due to individuals’ spending-down their
assets. I therefore exclude the subsample that was not eligible for Medicaid in
2002 but became eligible in 2004. 5.19% of the sample belongs to this category.
Again I do not …nd the coe¢ cient of informal care to be signi…cantly di¤erent
from that of the full sample. The coe¢ cient for Medicaid is largely unchanged
as well. Additional estimations are performed by excluding the Medicaid and
the long-term care insurance variables, and the informal care coe¢ cient is
found to be robust.

VI

Treatment e¤ect and its distribution

The distribution of treatment e¤ects is generally ignored in a frequentist nonBayesian approach, but it can be conveniently obtained from the posterior
distributions of the Bayesian MCMC procedure. The nature of health care
utilization especially long-term care warrants further examination of the distribution of treatment e¤ects because a simple mean treatment e¤ect would
not be enough to reveal the entire picture. In this section I focus on the
distribution of treatment e¤ects that consist of individual treatment e¤ects.
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Paid home care is omitted from this exercise because data are not available
for intensity of utilization.
For a randomly chosen individual, the expected di¤erence in outcome between the treated (de…ned as those who had informal care) and the non-treated
is the average treatment e¤ect (ATE) de…ned as
E(y1

y0 j

) = E(y1 j

)

E(y0 j

)

(11)

where = ( 1 ; 2 ; 1 ; 2 ; ; 1 ; 2 ; 2 ; z ). The expected di¤erence conditional
on being treated is the average treatment e¤ect on the treated (ATET) de…ned
as
E(y1 y0 j ; d = 1) = E(y1 j ; d = 1) E(y0 j ; d = 1)
(12)

where y1 is the outcome for the treated, and y0 is the counterfactual (the
outcome if the elderly were not treated), and d = 1 indicates treatment.
The ATE and the ATET are presented in TABLE 5. The mean treatment
e¤ects for both ATE and ATET are negative for nursing home care, hospital
care and physician visits. I …nd that an elderly person who had informal
care would have stayed in nursing homes for 2.3 months longer if she had
not had informal care. All results have large standard deviations, indicating
heterogeneous individual treatment e¤ects.
TABLE 5 Average Treatment e¤ect and Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated

Nursing home (months)

ATE

ATET

mean (st.dev)

mean (st.dev)

-0.44 (2.06)

-2.31 (4.27)

Hospital inpatient (nights)

-0.86 (2.33)

-4.56 (3.45)

Physician visits (numbers)

-0.25 (6.67)

-1.30 (15.30)

The distributions of ATET are shown in Figure 2. There are large variations depending on the types of care. Compared with hospital inpatient care
and physician visits, the distribution for nursing home care has a sizable left
tail, which reveals large substitution e¤ects for long-term nursing home users.
According to Brown and Finkelstein (2009), more than 10% of elderly persons
live in nursing homes for more than 5 years, and our results indicate that
these extremely long stays can be substituted by informal care. Sorting the
ATET by its absolute value from largest to smallest, I …nd that the top 10%
would have stayed in nursing homes for 8 months longer in a two-year span
if they had not received informal care, which is considerably larger than the
mean treatment e¤ect. Compared with an average treated person, the top 10%
are more likely to be older (average 86 years old), Black (28%), rather than
Hispanic (2%) and to have more children (average 4.22). This subpopulation
should be the focus of long-term care policies.
24
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The distribution of treatment e¤ects for hospital is also skewed to the left,
though less so than nursing homes, with a median of -4.6 and minimum of
-19. For physician visits, the distribution is symmetric around the mean. The
range of the distribution is very large (max = 35, min = -45). This suggests
that informal care and physician visits are substitutes for approximately 50%
of the sample, and complements for 48% of the sample, and neither serves as
a substitute nor a complement for the remaining 2%. Again, if we sort the
ATET into its absolute value from largest to smallest, the top 10% would have
visited doctors 21 more times in the two-year span if they had not received
informal care. A careful examination of this subsample reveals that they are
better educated compared to the average treated person.
Figure 2. Distribution of the treatment effect

.4
.2

_ _j

0

Density

.6

Nursing Home Care

-30

-20

-10

0

Months

0 .02.04.06.08.1

Density

Hospital Inpatient

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

Physician Visit

0.005.01.015.02.025

Density

Nights

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

Numbers

Published by De Gruyter, 2012

Brought to you by | Old Dominion University
Authenticated | jdu@odu.edu author's copy
Download Date | 11/27/12 11:53 PM

25

Forum for Health Economics & Policy, Vol. 15 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Treatment e¤ect at the intensive and extensive margins
In this subsection, I simulate the changes of informal care at the intensive
and extensive margins and examine its impact on formal care utilization. The
results of this exercise can be used to design policies that may reduce costs
for Medicare and Medicaid. On the intensive margin, I let informal care hours
increase from 34 hours (median level) to 160 hours (full-time care) for elderly
who had informal care because most of them received part-time care. On the
extensive and intensive margins, I let informal care increase from 0 to 34 hours
and from 0 to 160 hours, respectively, for those who did not receive informal
care.
TABLE 6 presents the results. On the intensive margin, increasing informal
care from median to full-time leads to a 6.5 months reduction in nursing home
care, a 2.6 nights reduction in hospital stay and a 3 times reduction in physician
visits in a two-year period. Increasing informal care from 0 to 34 hours leads
to a 0.34 months ( 10 days) decrease in nursing home care, a 1.3 nights
decrease in hospital stays, and a 1.7 times decrease in physician visits in a
two-year period. When informal care hours are increased from 0 to full-time,
the mean treatment e¤ects are a 1-month decrease in nursing home care, a 2.4
nights decrease in hospital stay and a 5.4 times decrease in physician visits. In
summary, informal care has the largest substitution e¤ects for nursing home
and hospital inpatient care at the intensive margin.
TABLE 6 Treatment E¤ects for Formal Care Utilization
Intensive margin

Nursing home (months)

Intensive and extensive margins

Median to full

Zero to median

Zero to full

-6.48 (7.94)

-0.34 (1.05)

-1.04 (3.33)

Hospital inpatient (nights)

-2.55 (1.28)

-1.30 (0.74)

-2.36 (1.51)

Physician visits (numbers)

-3.14 (1.45)

-1.70 (0.74)

-5.43 (2.16)

Note: treatment e¤ects at the intensive margin are calculated for the treated group.
Treatment e¤ects at the intensive and extensive margins are for the non-treated.
Median level of care is 34 hours and full-time of care is 160 hours per month.

VII

Policy analysis

Government cost-saving analysis is performed in this section. I focus on nursing home and hospital care because large substitution e¤ects are found for
them. In 2009, long-term care accounted for 32% of total Medicaid expenses
and institutional care accounted for 45% of overall long-term care expenditure
(Eiken et al., 2010). Medicare does not cover long-term care per se, but it
covers skilled nursing facilities following hospitalization, and it does not cover
any stay of more than a hundred days. Because Medicaid and Medicare cover
26
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di¤erent types of care, in the following analysis I examine policy implications
by payer type.
Because most tax-credit programs require the caregiver to provide fulltime care, two potential policies are studied based on the simulation in the
previous section. The estimates in TABLE 6 are used as references in this
section. The …rst is to let an average non-treated elderly person receive fulltime care from children. Because the per diem cost of staying in a nursing home
was $181 in 2003 (p.x, CBO, 2004), total saving by informal care would be
$5,647 ($181 30 1:04). According to the Center for Medicare & Medicaid
Services national health expenditure data, in 2004, Medicaid paid 44.7% of
nursing home expenditure and Medicare paid 14.7%. The cost saving for
Medicaid would be $2,524 (0:447 5; 647) and that for Medicare would be
$830 (0:147 5; 647) in a two-year period. The second policy intervention
is to have an average median-level cared-for elderly person receive full-time
care. The total savings that would result from informal care would equal
$35,186 ($181 30 6:48). The cost saving in a two-year period for Medicaid
and Medicare would be $15,728 and $5,172, respectively. The reduction in
spending is larger for the second policy because informal care has a larger
substitution e¤ect.
For hospital inpatient care, the treatment e¤ects for the two policy interventions are -2.36 and -2.55, respectively. Medicare pays 29.2% of hospital
spending, and Medicaid pays approximately 17.1%.17 Based on the estimates
of Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the average charge for
one-day of hospital inpatient care for a Medicare patient is $4,455 and $3,456
for a Medicaid patient. Under the …rst policy, Medicare would save $3,070
(4; 455 2:36 0:29), and Medicaid would save $1,394 (3; 456 2:36 0:17) in
a two-year period. Under the second policy, the cost saving for Medicare and
Medicaid would be $3,317 (4; 455 2:55 0:29) and $1,507 (3; 456 2:55 0:17),
respectively. In the case of hospital care, the two policies yield similar amount
of savings, but yield a greater amount for Medicare than for Medicaid.
TABLE 7 summarizes the simulation results. The …rst policy provides similar cost saving for Medicare and Medicaid whereas the second policy provides
more cost saving for Medicaid. If both policies are implemented, the total savings would reach $12,389 for Medicare and $21,153 for Medicaid (both feeral
and state) in a two-year period for an average elderly person. The cost saving
for Medicaid is much larger than for Medicare because Medicaid is the main
payer for long-term care.
To provide care to the elderly, caregivers may incur negative labor market
outcomes, therefore we need to take into account the loss in tax revenue due
to caregivers who quit their jobs or shorten working hours. Carmichael et
17

The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services national health expenditure data.
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al. (2010) report that people who are not employed or who are in low-paid
jobs are more likely to provide care. Based on our sample, the median annual
income for an adult child caregiver is approximately $24,000, which is subject
to a 15.3% payroll tax (half paid by employer and half paid by employee)
and a federal income tax that I assume to be 15%. For a full-time worker
who quits her job, the tax revenue loss in a two-year span is around $14,000
(2 24; 000 (15% + 15:3%)). For a part-time employee who quits her job or
a full-time employee who switches to a part-time job, the loss in tax revenue
would be smaller. This suggests a net gain for the government when informal
care hours are increased from medium to full time (the second policy). Under
the …rst policy, the government could incur either a net gain or a net loss
depending on how large the reduction in tax revenue is.18
TABLE 7 Cost Savings for Medicare and Medicaid
Nursing home
Medicare

Medicaid

Hospital Inpatient

Total savings

Simulation 1

830($)

3,070($)

3,900($)

Simulation 2

5,172

3,317

8,489

Subtotal

6,002

6,387

12,389

Simulation 1

2,524

1,394

3,918

Simulation 2

15,728

1,507

17,235

Subtotal

18,252

2,901

21,153

Note: Simulation 1 targets the non-treated group and let informal care hours increase
from 0 to full-time. Simulation 2 targets the treated group and let informal care hours
increase from median to full-time.

To conclude, the cost saving for Medicaid and Medicare largely derive from
the second policy that targets elderly persons who had received some informal
care from children. The cost saving for Medicaid arises mainly from substituting informal care for nursing home utilization whereas the saving for Medicare
is largely from reductions in the utilization of hospital inpatient care. Because
there exists large heterogeneity in the utilization patterns (as shown in Figure
2), informal care policies should focus more on the subgroup that incurs the
largest substitution e¤ects in the distribution.

VIII

Test of endogeneity

Bayesian estimation provides a convenient tool for testing the endogeneity of
1 8 In order to obtain more precise and aggregate estimates of total savings, we will need
information on public insurance savings and costs, state tax revenue losses, costs or savings
in other types of formal care, indirect cost of informal care, and the number of people who
are eligible for the tax credit.
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informal care by comparing the ratio of marginal likelihoods for two models.
The restricted model imposes ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 0), whereas the unrestricted model
allows 1 and 2 to vary. The Bayes factor is used to test endogeneity and
the results are reported in TABLE 8. For nursing home care, the Bayes factors calculated using the Savage Dickey density ratio are very close to zero
1
) (see Appendix A.), which supports
for all three priors ( = 14 ; = 18 ; = 20
the unrestricted model that allows endogeneity. The Bayes factors hospital
inpatient care and paid home health care are greater than unity, which supports the restricted model, indicating no endogeneity. For physician visits, the
Bayes factors suggest the restricted model at ( = 14 ; = 18 ) but indicate the
1
existence of endogeneity when = 20
.
These results show that informal care is endogenous for nursing home care,
but I do not …nd informal care to be endogenous for hospital and paid home
health care. For physician visits, the evidence is mixed. These results suggest
that caution should be exercised when we estimate the relationship between
informal care and nursing home utilization.
TABLE 8 Is Informal Care Endogenous?
1
= 81
= 20
Endogeneity?
= 14
Nursing home care
0.000
0.000
0.000
yes
Hospital inpatient

3.413

1.581

1.083

no

Physician visit

3.322

1.975

0.828

mixed

Home health care

7.000

5.044

3.268

no

Note: Bayes factor >1 indicates no endogeneity.

IX

Conclusion

This paper estimates the e¤ects of informal care on formal care utilizations
using an endogenous two-part model that treats informal care as endogenous.
The results are based on the Bayesian MCMC procedure and the data augmentation method that generates latent variables. The main …nding of this
paper is that informal care serves as a substitute for nursing home and hospital
inpatient care. Elderly persons who received informal care were less likely to
enter nursing homes and hospitals. In addition, the length of stay was shortened if they were admitted to nursing homes or hospitals. In studies using a
European dataset, Bonsang (2009) …nd that the substitution e¤ect disappears
for the more disabled elderly, and Bolin et al. (2007) …nd hospital visits and
informal care to be complements rather than substitutes, which is clearly a
departure from the results of this paper and other papers that use the U.S.
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data.
This study also …nds that informal care does not a¤ect the probability of
physician visits, but it does reduce the number of visits. For paid home health
care, the e¤ects of informal care are statistically insigni…cant, which is somewhat unexpected. Further analysis shows that informal care is a complement
to paid home health care for disabled or more impaired elderly, but acts as a
substitute for the relatively healthy elderly. Compared with previous studies
in the literature, larger substitution e¤ects of informal care are found. The
marginal e¤ects almost double those of Van Houtven and Norton (2004), who
applied a di¤erent modelling strategy and used data from the 1990s. This
could be due to several factors. First, in more recent years, the elderly have
been less disabled and are thus more able to ful…ll their needs through informal
care utilization. Second, recent development in tele-care that facilitates monitoring health conditions at home through technological advances may have
enhanced the e¤ectiveness of informal care. Third, the changing demographics of caregivers may play a role.
Adding to the literature on informal care, this paper explores the heterogeneous treatment e¤ects. I …nd that the substitution e¤ect of informal care
is larger for long-term nursing home users than for short-term users. I …nd
that the substitution e¤ect is much larger for those who had less than three
days of hospital stay and who are thus unlikely to qualify for Medicare skilled
nursing facility reimbursement. These results have implications for policies
that call for expanding Medicare coverage (such as, dropping the requirement
of a three-day prior hospitalization and increase the one-hundred-day limit) to
cover more long-term care related services.
Average treatment e¤ects are calculated and the distributions of the treatment e¤ects show great heterogeneity in the elderly population. In particular,
large substitution e¤ects are found for older African American women who
have multiple children. Treatment e¤ects are calculated at both the intensive
and extensive margins. The largest substitution e¤ects occur for nursing home
and hospital care at the intensive margin. The policy analysis shows that an
appropriate amount of subsidy can induce children to provide full-time care,
thus potentially reducing government spending on Medicaid and Medicare.
The cost saving for Medicaid is larger than that for Medicare and depends on
the work status of the caregivers.
Future research may focus on other types of long-term or mixed types of
care. For example, there is an increase in the use of assisted living facilities in the United States, which cost about half as much as nursing homes
(MetLife Mature Market Institute, 2009). Assisted living facilities tend to attract middle-income seniors with low or moderate levels of disability. As this
is a di¤erent demographic and socioeconomic group, the relationship between
30

Brought to you by | Old Dominion University
Authenticated | jdu@odu.edu author's copy
Download Date | 11/27/12 11:53 PM

Du: Formal and Informal Care: An Empirical Bayesian Analysis

informal care and the use of assisted living facilities may not be the same.
Other types of care, such as intensive service days in nursing homes in an
attempt to avoid hospitalization are shown to reduce admissions as well as
length of stay if admitted (Kane et al., 2002). Future studies may also focus
on the trade-o¤ between outcome and cost. In some cases, better outcomes
may be achieved for institutional care when safety becomes an issue. However,
the extent to which outcomes are compromised by using informal care or other
non-institutionalized care is still unknown.

Appendix A: Bayesian algorithm
The Bayesian estimation algorithm is presented in the following order: (1) the
posterior distributions of the parameters, priors and the likelihood function;
(2) the treatment e¤ects of informal care on formal care utilization; and (3)
the test for the endogeneity of informal care.
Prior, likelihood and posteriors
A normal prior with large variance is used for the coe¢ cients 1 ; 2 ; 1 ; 2 ;
(Chib, 1992) and a prior with relatively smaller variance is used for the coef…cients on informal care ( 1 ; 2 ),19 and it follows that
1
1

N (0k ; 10Ik )
N (0k ; 10Ik )
N (0k ; 10Ik )

2

N (0k ; 10Ik )
N (0k ; 10Ik )

N (0k ; Ik )

2

N (0k ; Ik )

1

2

1
;
4

1
;
8

(13)
(14)
1
)
20

=
=
are used to
where three sets of informative priors ( =
test for sensitivity and endogeneity. The natural conjugate prior for the error
variances 2 and 2u is the inverse gamma density, which can be expressed as
2

;

2
u

invG(c0 =2; (d0 =2) 1 )

(15)

where c0 = 5 and d0 = 10.
The likelihood for this model is the joint density of z , z, Y1 , Y1 , Y2 , and
Y2 , in which both latent variables and observed variables are included.
Let = (w; x; 1 ; 2 ; 1 ; 2 ; ; 1 ; 2 ; 2 ; 2u ); one can write the joint density
19

A proper informative prior for

1

and

2

is needed for the test of endogeneity.
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as
p(z ; z; Y1 ; Y1 ; Y2 ; Y2
p(Y1
p(Y2
p(Y2

j ) = p(z j ) p(z j z ; )
j z; z ; ) p(Y1 j Y1 ; z; z ; )
j Y1 ; Y1 ; z; z ; )
j Y2 ; Y1 ; Y1 ; z; z ; )

(16)

for nursing home care, Ynh is used instead Y2 .
The posterior density is proportional to the product of the prior given in
(13), (14), and (15), and the joint density is given in (16). Since there are no
analytical solutions for the joint density, the Gibbs sampler (a MCMC procedure) is used (Koop, 2003). This entails making sequential draws from each of
the conditional densities. These draws include draws for the latent variables
as well. The data augmentation approach makes the Bayesian MCMC method
especially convenient for draws of latent variables (Tanner and Wong, 1987).
For count data such as hospital inpatient care and physician visits, the
Bayesian algorithm additionally involves the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
(this is also a MCMC procedure) for Y2 since it is hard to take draws from the
conditional posterior density. Instead, draws will be taken from a candidate
density and they are accepted with an acceptance ratio. The MCMC procedure
is presented in Appendix B in detail.
Average treatment e¤ects
The goal of this study is to estimate the e¤ect of informal care on formal care
utilization.
Treatment is de…ned as the receipt of informal care (z > 0). The observed
outcome for formal care utilization can be written as
y = dy1 + (1

(17)

d)y0

d = 1 if z > 0 and d = 0 if z = 0
where y1 is the outcome for the treated and y0 is the counterfactual (the
outcome if the elderly person were not treated), and y corresponds to Y2 in
Section III.
For a randomly chosen individual, the expected di¤erence in the outcome
between the treated and the non-treated is the average treatment e¤ect (ATE)
E(y1

y0 j

) = E(y1 j

)

E(y0 j

(18)

)

where = ( 1 ; 2 ; 1 ; 2 ; ; 1 ; 2 ; 2 ; z ; z0 ; z1 ). The expected di¤erence conditional on being treated is the average treatment e¤ect on the treated (ATET).
E(y1

y0 j

; d = 1) = E(y1 j

; d = 1)

E(y0 j

; d = 1)

(19)
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For the ATE, the conditional expected outcomes and the counterfactual for
the Poisson distribution can be written as, respectively,
E(y1 j

) = (x 1 + z1 1 + (z
w ) 1)
exp(x 2 + z1 2 + (z
w ) 2 + 0:5 2 )
;
1 exp( exp(x 2 + z1 2 + (z
w ) 2 ))

E(y0 j

) = (x 1 + z0 1 + (z
w ) 1)
exp(x 2 + z0 2 + (z
w ) 2 + 0:5 2 )
:
1 exp( exp(x 2 + z0 2 + (z
w ) 2 ))

(20)

(21)

For log-normal distribution (for nursing homes), the ATE can be written as
E(y1 j

) = (x 1 + z1 1 + (z
w ) 1)
exp(x 2 + z1 2 + (z
w ) 2 + 0:5 2 );

(22)

E(y0 j

) = (x 1 + z0 1 + (z
w ) 1)
exp(x 2 + z0 2 + (z
w ) 2 + 0:5 2 ):

(23)

The ATE are obtained at both the extensive and intensive margins, in particular for (z0 ; z1 ) = (0; 3:5); (0; 5); (3:5; 5). Those values correspond to an imposed
increase in hours of informal care from zero to median level care, zero to fulltime care, and median level to full-time care, respectively. The last step is to
integrate out by averaging over the sample from the posterior distribution.
That is,
!
N
S
1 X 1X^
AT E =
E(y1i y0i j i )
(24)
N i=1 S s=1
where N is the sample size, s = 1; :::S are the posterior draws after burn-in,
^

and E(y1i

y0i j

i)

is an estimate of E(y1i

y0i j

i ).

Testing endogeneity
The endogeneity of informal care is tested by comparing the likelihood of
the restricted model (M1 ), where ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 0), with the likelihood of the
unrestricted model (M2 ) that allows the correlation parameters to vary. The
Bayesian method does not yield numerical values for these likelihoods, but a
simpli…ed method referred to as the Savage-Dickey density ratio can be applied
when the two models are nested (Koop, 2003). This ratio avoids calculating the
marginal likelihood directly. It does require that the priors for the restricted
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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and the unrestricted model to be the same at the point ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 0), an
assumption that is reasonable in this case.
Using the Savage-Dickey density ratio, the Bayes factor can be written as
the ratio of the posterior and the prior evaluated at ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 0) (Chib,
Greenberg and Winkelmann, 1998).
BF1;2 =

p(

= 0; 2 = 0 j data; M2 )
p( 1 = 0; 2 = 0 j M2 )
1

(25)

The Savage-Dickey density ratio only involves the unrestricted model (M2 )
and the calculation of the prior and posterior densities. The prior density can
be evaluated directly, whereas the posterior density can be calculated using the
output from the Gibbs sampler or the Metropolis Hasting procedure because
the posterior density depends on all parameters in the model. Because the
less informative priors tend to favor the null hypothesis that ( 1 ; 2 ) = (0; 0),
informative priors are used. BF1;2 larger than 1 indicates no endogeneity, and
its being less than 1 indicates endogeneity.

Appendix B: Bayesian markov chain monte carlo procedure
The MCMC procedure consists of the following steps.
steps (1)-(3): treat the latent variables z ; Y1 ; Y2 as additional parameters
in the model and data-augmenting them by taking draws from the appropriate
full conditional density.
steps (4)-(6): take draws from the appropriate full conditional density for
all other parameters ( 1 ; 2 ; 1 ; 2 ; ; 1 ; 2 ).
step (7): take draws from the full conditional density for 2 and 2u .
These steps are presented in the following order.
(1) When z = 0, the latent variable z can be drawn from the truncated
normal distribution N (z; v), where
v = (1 +

2
1

+

2
2

2

)

1

(26)

and
z = w + v[ 1 (Y1

x1

1

z 1) +

2

2

(Y2

x2

2

z 2 )]

(27)

Truncation is below zero. When z > 0;we have z = z.
(2) The latent variable Y1 can be drawn from a truncated normal distribution N [x 1 + z 1 + (z
w ) 1 ; 1] . The distribution is truncated below zero
if Y1 = 1.
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(3) For count outcomes (hospital inpatient care and physician visits), is
drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of x 2 + z 2 + (z w ) 2 and
a variance of 2 when Y1 = 0. When Y1 = 1; the full conditional density for
is proportional to
p(

j

1

exp( exp( )) exp( Y2 )
Y2 !
1 2
(
x 2 z 2
exp
2

)=

1

exp( exp( ))
w ) 2 )2 :

(z

(28)

The Metropolis-Hastings Method makes candidate draw
from a proposal
distribution q( ) (Chib and Greenberg, 1995). This draw is accepted with a
probability of
p( j ; z )q( )
( ; ) = min
;1
(29)
p( j ; z )q( )
where is the current draw and
is the candidate draw.
For continuous variable (nursing home care), Ynh is instead drawn from a
normal distribution with a mean of x 2 + z 2 + (z
w ) 2 and a variance of
2
when Y1 = 0. When Y1 = 1, we have Ynh = exp(Ynh ).
(4) Given that the prior of is N ( ; v ), the posterior distribution of is
N ( ; v ), where
v = (v + w0 (1 + 21 + 22 2 )w) 1
(30)
=v

v + w0 (1 +

2
1

2
2

+

w

0

2

2

2

)z
(Y2

w0
x2

1 (Y1
2

x1

1

z 1)

:

z 2)

(31)

(5) I specify the prior distribution for ( 1 ; 1 ) to be N ( 1; v 11 ) and the
prior distribution for 1 to be N ( 1 ; v 11 ). De…ne 1 = ( 1 ; 1 ; 1 ), C =
(x; z; (z

w )), then the conditional distribution of
v

and
1

=v

is N ( 1 ; v

v1 0
+ C 0C
0 v 1

=

1

1

1
1

1v

1

1v

1

1
1

) where
(32)

+ C 0 Y1

(33)

(6) Similarly to step (5), I specify the prior for ( 2 ; 2 ) to be N ( 2 ; v 21 )
and the prior distribution for 2 to be N ( 2 ; v 21 ). De…ne 2 = ( 2 ; 2 ; 2 ),
then the conditional distribution of
v

2

=

2

is N ( 2 ; v

v2 0
+ C0
0 v 2

1
2

2

C
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and
2

=v

1
2

2v

2

2v

2

+ C0

2

Y2

(35)

(7) Finally, let the prior of 2 and 2u be invG(c0 =2; ; (d0 =2) 1 ). The posterior conditional distribution can be written as,
!
c0 +N
;
2
G h d0 (Y2 x 2 z 2 (z w ) 2 )0 (Y2 x 2 z 2 (z w ) 2 ) i 1
(36)
+
2
2

(8) Repeat the above steps for a burn-in of 5,000 draws that are discarded,
and then for another S = 10; 000 draws that are kept.
In summary, the Gibbs sampler procedure entails draws from the normal,
the truncated normal, and the gamma distributions. If the health outcome is
a count, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is additionally applied as shown
in step (3).
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